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ABSTRACT . ..
This thesis is an aru f regime transition in modern political
systems. These transitions c._ occur gradually or dramatically and may -...
lead to changes in the basic characteristics of a government. Occasionally
the changes in basic characteristics are significant enough-to affect-the
type of government. This thesis analyzes the basic characteristics of
political systems and develops a model for explaining regime transition.
The thesis specifically examines changes in the power relationship
between elite and mass participation in civil society, political society and
the state, leading to the following processes: liberalization, regression,
revolution and coups d'etat. These processes can result in transitions of
democratic regimes to non-democracies and vice versa. The model
developed in this thesis addresses a basic definitional problem that exists
in previous analyses and it simplifies the systematic cross-national
analysis of regime types and transitions. Finally, the thesis applies the
model to the cases of Argentina (1976 and 1983), Germany (1919-1934),
and Guatemala (1993). The case study analysis advances the hypothesis
that the mechanism of regime transition is the same in all political
systems even though the types of transition are different.
ill
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EXECUTIVE SU MIARY
"An Analysis of Regime Transition:
The Characteristics, Mechanism and Types
of Change in Modem Political Systems"
LT Scott Alfred Weidie, USN
June 1993
This thesis analyzes regime transition in modem political systems.
Specifically, it addresses (1) the basic characteristics of political systems; (2) the
degree of differences in these characteristics; and (3) changes in the
characteristics of political systems. Based on Robert Dahi's analysis of political
systems the thesis develops a new model to explain change in modem political
systems.
Previous analyses of political systems have encountered a basic
definitional problem by either using an inclusive definition of democracy or a
procedural definition without a method for distinguishing between democratic
and non-democratic regimes. The thesis presents a revised two-axis model
that addresses the definitional problem and combines the concepts of
consolidation and stability into a more effective system for categorizing
regimes and conducting comparative analysis.
A mechanism to explain regime transition is developed that combines
societal and institutional factors. Differences in the degree of participation of a
society's population are combined with the concept of a society organized into
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three arenas for the expression and advancement of interests. The combination
of these concepts yields a mechanism relating the competition of elites and
masses in society to the structure and stability of a political system.
The thesis examines various methods of regime transition and applies
the theory to several cases. The following cases are briefly examined and
classified by regime type in the two-axk- model: the United States; Switzerland,
prior to February 1971; Argentina; Venezuela; the Republic of South Africa;
Cambodia; the Republic of the Sudan; Mexico; Ghana; Cuba; and, the State of
Bahrain. Additionally, an extensive analysis of the mechanism of regime
transition is conducted in the following cases: Argentina's 1976 coup d'etat and
1983 redemocratization; Germany's deconsolidation of democracy in the
Weimar Republic and consolidation of non-democracy in the Third Reich
(1919-1934); and, the possible case of a liberalizing coup d'etat in Guatemala in
May and June of 1993.
An important co~ntribution of this thesis is the development of a better
model to assist in the classification and comparative analysis of political
systems but the primary contribution of the thesis is the advancement of the
hypothesis that the mechanism of regime transition is the same in all political
systems even though the types of transition are different.
The mechanism of regime transition is the power relationship between
elites and masses in a society. When a regime transition occurs, it is the result
of a change in the balance of power between elites and masses in one or more
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of the three elements of a society: the state, the political arena, and civil
society. The transition does not occur as a result of some other factor such as
change (or lack of change) in the economy. For exa7riple, i decrease in per
capita income does not directly result in a change in the political system. Any
.such variables are merely antecedents to the changing interests of the elites
and masses in a society. It is the organization (or lack of organization) of elites
and masses in the state, political society, and civil society that allows for the
advancement (or attempted advancement) of elites and masses. When the
relative strength of one set of interests increases with respect to the other, one
group may gain enough power to change the overall balance of power between
the groups. The changed power structure may result in regime transition.
Viii
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE DILEMMA AND THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
Given a political system, can a more effective model or theory be
developed to examine the basic characteristics1 of that system? The question
implies that political systems have more than one characteristic, and because it
may be possible for characteristics to differ, then it is possible for different
political systems to exist. Given that it is possible that characteristics may
change, then it is also possible for political systems to change. And given the
possibility that political systems can change, can a mechanism be developed to
explain these changes? Finally, by combining the basic characteristics of a
regime with the mechanism explaining regime changes, can a model be
developed-to analyze the overall transformation of the system (regime
transition)?
A primary goal of this paper is the development of that model. This
model will address a basic definitional problem that exists in previous analyses
and it will simplify and aid in an understanding of regime transition.! A
' Throughout this paper, the term characteristics will
be used to describe what Robert A. Dahl termed the
"theoretical dimensions of democratization", in his book,
Polvarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1971), p. 4.
2 This paper will only concern itself with regime
transition in already independent nation-states. Excluded
from this analysis will be examples of regime transition in
I
commonly accepted framework for analyzing regime type and transition is
essential for the comparative analysis of political system change occurring
between two different periods of time in a single-case study or in the
systematic cross-national analysis of several different regime transitions.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY & METHODOLOGY
This paper will begin by briefly reviewing some key theoretical
contributions and examining important definitions and concepts related to
regime transition. Several of these concepts and definitions will be
incorporated into a revised two-axis zr.odel. This model will introduce the
four basic types of regimes that can theoretically exist The model will be
expanded upon later by the further introduction of additional concepts. These
additional concepts will form the basis for the "labeling" of various regime
types located in the model.
The concept of regime transition will be examined and a mechanism
will be developed to explain how and why these transitions occur. The
mechanism will consist of an analysis of the interaction between elites and
masses in various elements of society. Finally, the paper will point out the
various ways in which the mechanism of regime transition can occur by
"hitherto dependent countries subject to other states' and
in "independent political systems as a result of military
conquest* by external powers. See Polvarchy, chapter 3, for
a discussion of the various historical sequences leading to
the inauguration of competitive regimes in political
systems.
2
analyzing the distinct types of transition (revolution, coup d'etat, liberalization,
etc.) which can occur.
The paper will also incorporate various examples of the different
regimes and types of regime transition in various political systems for a brief
analysis. This brief comparative analysis will assist in formulating a
hypothesis that attempts to explain regime transition.
The concluding section will assess the new model's ability to simplify
the analysis of regime transition in a political system and assist in the
comparative analysis of multiple political systems and regime transitions. In
particular, it will focus on the model's ability to categorize regimes by type.
Additionally, this section will provide an argument that will support the
hypothesis that the mechanism of regime transition is the same in all political
syswns even though the types of transition are different.
C. SOURCES
The literature on regime transition is very extensive. While most of the
work can be generally categorized according to the type of transition it seeks
to explain, relatively few major works deal with the broad study of political
order and change. Some of these works will be examined later but the main
focus of attention of this thesis will be on the model developed by Robert Dahl
in his book, Polyarchy: Part.cipation and Opposition (1971) - an examination
of "democratization." This thesis will utilize L. ncepts from this and several
3




A. DEFINING TERMS AND CONCEPTS
Before any substantive analysis of political systems and regime
* transition can occur, several concepts and definitions must be established.
The most basic concept which will be utilized throughout this paper is
the idea of a polity. A polity is the form of government of a nation, state, or
organization? The term can also be defined as any organized society, such as
a nation, having one specific form of government 4 This paper will utilize the
first definition and it will be used interchangeably with the terms regime,
government, and political system. The second definition is too broad to be
useful in this analysis. An organized society has many elements, like elites,
masses, and political society, some of which will be incorporated later in the
paper.
The form or type of government is determined by its characteristics.
These characteristics must be examined before it is possible to make any
observations on the possible forms of a government. Simply put, the pieces of
a puzzle must first be examined prior to joining the parts into a whole. The
two characteristics found in any political system are: (1) liberalization, the
' William Morris, ed., The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1976), p. 1015.
4 Ibid.
5
"...extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political
competition," and (2) inclusiveness, the "...proportion of the population entitled
to participate ... in controlling and contesting the conduct of government."
These concepts, and Dahi's model, will be examined later.
There is one additional term that must be defined - democracy. The
definition of democracy can be generally described as falling along a
continuum starting with a minimal set of criteria and proceeding to an all-
inclusive meaning. A strict definition of democracy would be limited to a
political system with the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free
and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective
political office from electoral accountability' (procedural definition). A slightly
broader, but still narrow and procedural, definition of democracy would
describe a political system completely or almost completely responsive to its
citizens.7 According to Dahl, this definition, with its dimensions of
contestation and participation, has eight institutional guarantees: freedom to
form and join organizations; freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility
for public office; the right of political leaders to compete for support (votes);
alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; and institutions for
s Dahl, Polvarchy, p. 4.
6 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic ReQimes:
Crisis, Breakdown, and Reeauilibration, (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 5-6.
""Dahl, Polvarchy, pp. 2-4.
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making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of
preference! Finally, the broadest definition of democracy would be defined in
terms of sources of authority for government (rule of, by, and for the people)
or purposes for government (social equality)?
For the purposes of this paper (and as explained in footnote 9), a limited
procedural definition will be used. Some consider this procedural definition of
democracy as a demanding "ideal type" and state, "Obviously, no real world
regime fits the ideal type perfectly; indeed many regimes that hold regular
elections fall far short,"'1 but there is room for disagreement with this
statement. The limited procedural definition can serve to establish a boundary
between democratic and non-democratic forms of government as distinctive
regimes on the political spectrum rather than as opposite ends of a continuum.
It is possible for regimes to exceed the minimum requirements of the definition
8 Ibid, p. 3.
9 See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Modest Meaning of
Democracy" in Robert A. Pastor, ed., Democracy in the
Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, (New York, NY: Holmes and
Meier, 1989), pp. 11-25 for an extensive discussion of the
meaning of democracy, and see also Huntington, The Third
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13
for support for the procedural definition that makes "it
possible to judge to what extent political systems are
democratic, to compare systems, and to analyze whether
systems are becoming more or less democratic."
11 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley,
"PIntroduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes"
in Higley and Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 1.
7
and approach a broader definition, therefore, the definition is not an "ideal".
As will be shown later, more than a few regimes meet this 'ideal" definition.
There is obviously no disagreement with the portion of the statement that
notes many regimes fall short of constituting democracies despite allowing
elections. With a workable definition of democracy, an analysis of the
literature is now possible."1
B. ANALYSIS OF THE DAHLIAN MODEL OF POLITICAL
SYSTEMS & THE BASIC DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
As mentioned earlier, Robert Dahl's procedural definition is comprised
of certain institutional guarantees that can be expressed by two components
which he presents in diagrammatic fashion (see Figure 1). The two
dimensions, the degree of public contestation and the degree of participation,
comprise the entire field of "democratization".1
Dahl's figure provides the basic concept for the formation of this paper's
revised model. Dahl places four different political systems in each comer of
the diagram. These systems are defined by their varying degrees of
" Only significant literature contributing to the
concepts essential to the development of the revised
analytical model will be examined.
12 Dahl, Polvarchy, pp. 5-7. Since Dahl's "theoretical
dimensions of democratization" figure illustrates, in one
extreme, a state defined by its total lack of opposition and
participation, a regime employing this mode of rule
obviously cannot be considered a democracy. Thus the field
of "democratization" must also consider the extent to which
Dahl's institutional conditions are denied. In this way
Dahl's "dimensions of democratization" encompasses all forms
of political systems.
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contestation and participation. A very important distinction between these
dimensions must be noted. Dahl notes that, both historically and even now,
regimes vary the extent to which his eight institutional conditions are "...openly
available, publicly employed, and fully guaranteed." Furthermore, the second
dimension is necessary because regimes may "...permit opposition to a very
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[source: Robert Dahl's Polvarchy, p. 7.]
Also included in the original model are three paths (path I [from c
to a to b], path H [from c to d to b] and path IIT [from c to b]) to describe
various directions of change a regime may undergo in the development
to a more democratized political system. There is at least one additional
path not included in Dahl's original, path IV (from b to c), which
"1 Ibid, p. 4.
9
represents the transition from an inclusive democratic to an exclusive
non-democratic regime. This and other paths were prob1ably omitted
because the focus of Dah's work was to examine the conditions that
favor or impede a transition to more democratized political systems.14
Path IV has been added to Dahrs figure due to the nature of this paper's
objectives.
The most basic problem with Dahls "democratization" figure is
that it does not provide for a dear distinction between democratic and
non-democratic forms of government as his procedural definition should
allow. The figure represents a continuum between regime types. The
model presented later will provide a solution for making the distinction
between regime types.
Another problem arises in making a comparison of the relative
degrees of inclusiveness (participation) of a regime at different points in
time or between different regimes. The difference between what
constitutes an inclusive, and what constitutes an exclusive (limited
participation) regime, is not dear. Dahl does, however, recognize the
varying degrees of participation available in a population"5 and he at
least provides a comprehensive list of political systems that incorporates
'4 Ibid, p. 1.
15 Ibid, p. 4.
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an analysis of the varying degrees of participation in those systems."'
The revised model presented later will also provide a solution for
making the distinction between inclusive and exclusive political systems.
C. OVERVIEW OF REGIME TRANSITION LITERATURE &
ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS FOR REGIME
TRANSITION
The efforts to generate an understanding of political transitions
have been focused in several areas. 7 Several broad studies have
concentrated on democratization and political order."8 Another set of
studies has concentrated on the transitions from democracy to
16 Ibid, Appendix A, Table A-I, pp. 232-234.
17 See Michael C. Desch, "Transitions to Democracy: The
Role of Militaries," (Los Angeles, CA: By the author as a
visiting scholar, Center for International Studies,
University of Southern California, [third draft] 1991), p.
3, for a review of various explanations regarding regime
transition and for support for an explanation combining
societal and institutional factors. This review and analysis
is an important contribution to the development of a portion
of the mechanism for explaining regime transition that will
be developed in 'Chapter III.
"' See Dahl, Polvarchy; Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in ChanginQ Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1968) and The Third Wave; Seymour Martin Lipset,
"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy," in American Political Science
Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1959), pp. 1-34; Dankwart A.
Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,"
in Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April 1970), pp.
337-363.
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authoritarianism1 9 and others have examined the transitions of
authoritarian regimes back to democrades?'
Theory attempts to answer some fundamental questions toward an
ultimate objective of providing a greater understanding and explanation
of a particular event, in this case, the transition of political systems. The
general theories explaining regime transition broadly fall into two
categories: deterministic theories and probabilistic theories. While each
new theory advances the general knowledge of an event or set of events,
the problem with deterministic theories is that there is usually a
situation that does not fit the general explanation and the theory must be
modified, limited to a particular set of circumstances, or discarded.
In addition to the problems encountered by deterministic theories,
a brief analysis of non-deterministic, societal level explanations for
regime changes has also noted that there exists "...variance [with respect
"19 See Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American
Politics, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1973); and Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of
Democratic Regimes, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978).
20 See Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas; and
O'Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter, and Laurance Whitehead,
eds., Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for
Democracy, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986).
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to explanation] in a number of important cases."2' An alternate
approach to the problems encountered with the socioeconomic variables
can be solved by analyzing factors [necessary for the overthrow and
reestablishment of democratic regimes] that "...lie within the regime
itself, within the apparatus of state not outside in its relations with civil
society.'" But this approach also has problems because it ignores
important societal factors. Various explanations have combined, or
noted the importance of combining, societal and institutional factors in
an attempt to analyze the role of institutions (i.e., the military) and
provide a basis for explaining regime transition.' This final approach
will form the basis of the development of the mechanism which will be
used to explain regime transitions.
21 Desch, "Transitions to Democracy," p. 7.
22 See Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective
Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,"
in Armed Forces rand Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November 1975),
p. 20.
23 See Desch, "Transitions to Democracy", pp. 13-15;
Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in
Brazil, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971),
p. 55 and Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1988); and Abraham F. Lowenthal and Samuel J Fitch, eds.,
Armies and Politics in Latin America, [revised ed.], (New
York, NY: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc. 1986).
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III. A MODEL FOR REGIME TRANSITION
A. THE BASIC MODEL & THE FOUR BASIC REGIME TYPES
The first important contribution necessary to understanding
regime transition is the development of a new model. Using the limited,
procedural definition of democracy allows for a simple distinction
between democratic and non-democratic regimes. This distinction, when
coupled with a measure of the degree of participation and a measure of
the degree of liberalization provides for the formation of a revised model
that can simplify and aid in an understanding of regime transition.
The following model makes some changes to Dahi's model by
shifting the vertical "Liberalization (public contestation)" axis to a
horizontal "Regime Type" axis.24 Dahl's "Inclusiveness (degree of
participation)" axis is then centered vertically on the horizontal regime
type axis. The basic structure (see Figure 2) solves Dahl's regime
continuum problem by providing a distinct division between democratic
and non-democratic regimes in accordance with the procedural
24 The change in the name of the new horizontal axis
from 'liberalization" to 'regime type" is for two reasons.
First, the degree of liberalization in a political system
will determine the type of regime and this axis is necessary
for the later categorization of various regimes.
14
definition. All regimes left of the vertical participation axis can be
classified as "democratic" in that the regimes meet the minimum basic
requirements of the procedural definition. The further left along the
axis, the greater the degree of democratization. Regimes at the extreme
left of the regime type axis would meet all the requirements of the
broadest possible definition of democracy. All regimes right of the
participation axis fail to meet one or more of the eight requirements of
democracy. Regimes at the extreme right of the regime type axis would









(author's basic model illustrating the 4 basic regime types]
As mentioned earlier, a problem arises when attempting to
determine whether a regime is inclusive or exclusive. Since Dahl
defined inclusiveness in terms of the "-..proportion of the population
entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and
15
contesting the conduct of the government...."25 then it is theoretically
possible to have full (100%) participation as well as no (0%)
participation.2' By placing the regime type axis on the degree of
participation axis, a division between inclusive and exclusive regimes is
possible. Since the percentage of the population entitled to participate is
the measure of inclusiveness, then a distinction can be made that
categorizes regimes that allow greater than 50 percent of the population
to participate (vote) as "inclusionary" and regimes that restrict
participation to fifty percent or less of the popd.iation as "exclusionary".
According to the new model, four basic types of regimes are
theoretically possible: (a) inclusionary democratic, (b) exclusionary
democratic, (c) inclusionary non-democratic, and (d) exclusionary non-
democratic. Examples of regimes in areas (a) and (d) are numerous,
examples of regimes in areas (b) and (c) are less prevalent. The United
States is an example of an inclusive democratic regime.27 Bahrain
would be an example of an exclusive non-democratic regime28
25 Dahl, Polvarchy, p. 4, and Table A-i, pp. 232-234.
26 For the purposes of this paper, participation will
be measured by the proportion of the adult population
entitled to vote in elections.
27 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook. 1991, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1991), pp. 324-325.
28 Ibid, p. 23.
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At first it would seem absurd to have a democratic regime that
permitted participation to less than 50 percent of its population but the
model indicates the possibility. Since the procedural definition of
democracy used here is not qualified by any mention of the degree of
participation, such a regime is possible. A modem example might be the
Republic of South Africa, which may meet the minimum requirements
for a procedural democracy but denies voting participation to
approximately 70 percent of its population. 9
Examples of inclusionary non-democratic regimes are more
prevalent than would first seem. The modem Mexican state would fit
these conditions. Mexico has an inclusive and very vibrant political
society buL ther,- is significant doubt as to whether any elections can be
considered "free and fair".?0
29 Huntington considers political systems as democratic
"...to the extent that its most powerful collective decision
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic
elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and
in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to
vote., [author's emphasis]. Clearly, Huntington disagrees
with this example. See The Third Wave, p. 7.
30 Daniel C. Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule
Without Democracy," Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour
Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries:
Comparinq ExDeriences with Democracy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990), pp. 135-173
17
B. CONSOLIDATED AND UNCONSOLIDATED REGIMES
Prior to developing a mechanism to explain regime transition, two
final concepts must be incorporated into the model: the concepts of
consolidated and unconsolidated regimes. These concepts will allow the
revised two axis model to be divided into "cells"32 and incorporate
various types of political systems.
In an edited work by John Higley and Richard Gunther, the focus
[of the country stadies] is on the "...factors that contribute to the
successful consolidation of democratic regimes, rather than the transition
to democracy per se. " The editors seek to explain how elite
agreements, which may lead to consolidation, are created and sustained.
For Higley and Gunther, the mechanism for this consolidation is
"...distinctive elite transfonnations, carried out by the elites themselves,
[that] constitute the main and possibly the only route to democratic
consolidation." Higley and Gunther further state, "For consolidation to
occur ... elites that had previously been "disunified" must become
"31 Burton, Gunther, and Higley in Higlei and Gunther,
eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation -atin America
and Southern Europe, pp. 3-5.
32 This term is borrowed from Polvarchy, p. 6. Unlike
Dahl, this new model will create a typology to allow for a
greater description and analysis of regimes and regime
transition.
" Gunther and Higley, Elites and Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, pp. ix.
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"consensually unified" in regard to the basic procedures and norms by
which all politics will henceforth be played."3
The most basic problem with Higley and Gunther's theory is that
it only addresses half the problem - the consolidation of democracy. It
seems that whatever mechanism that might be developed to explain the
consolidation of democratic regimes might be applied to the
consolidation of non-democratic regimes as well.
According to Higley and Gunther, "...a consolidated democracy is a
regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in
which all politically significant groups accept established political
institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game."3' Along the
same lines, can the same conditions also hold true for non-democratic
regimes? That is, can a consolidated non-democracy lack all the criteria of a
procedural definition of democracy and also be free from competition
posed by any politically significant dissident groups? This certainly
seems to be a possibility and some real-world examples that
approximate these conditions will be provided later.
Continuing with some additional terms, unconsolidated democracies
would be regimes that still meet all. the procedural criteria of democracy
34 Ibid, pp. x-xi.
31 Ibid, p. 3-4.
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but in which some politically significant groups are engaged in (1)
semiloyal or (2) disloyal opposition?6 The opposite could also apply to
an unconsolidated non-democracy - the regime would not meet all of the
criteria to be considered a democracy and there would also be semiloyal
or disloyal opposition from politically significant groups.
It has been noted that there are always at least some dissident
groups, even in consolidated democratic systems,' but in order for a
regime, either democratic or non-democratic, to be considered as
consolidated, these groups cannot be a politically significant semiloyal or
disloyal opposition. The mere existence of a disloyal opposition that
questions the existence of the regime and aims at changing it through
extralegal means, usually by force, might be considered by some to be
politically significant but for the purposes of this paper, disloyal
opposition groups must be capable of mobilizing "intense, effective
support; and by a variety of means they can take power or at least
divide the allegiance of the population."3 In order for a regime to be
considered as unconsolidated, it must have either a semiloyal or disloyal
36 Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown and Reea'uilibration, pp. 27-38.
37 See Burton, Higley and Gunther, pp. 3-4, and Linz,
p. 28.
38 Phrase borrowed from Linz, p. 27.
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opposition. This is not to say that the opposition must be engaged in
actions that could threaten the survival of the regime, it only requires
that these groups be capable of mobilizing a threat. In situations in
which the actions of the opposition posed a threat to the continued
existence of the unconsolidated regime, the regime could be classified as
unstable. In cases in which the opposition was only semiloyal or disloyal
but politically insignificant, the unconsolidated regime would be
classified as stable.
By combining the concept of consolidation into the revised two
axis model, a more effective system for categorizing regimes and
conducting comparative analysis is now available (see Figure 3). Specific
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Figure 3
Notes: By definition, regimes in areas a and e are stable
consolidated democracies. Regimes in areas d and h are also
stable consolidated non-democracies. Regimes in areas b and
f can be stable or unstable unconsolidated democracies and
regimes in areas c and g can be stable or unstable
unconsolidated non-democracies.
C. THE MECHANISM OF REGIME TRANSITION
The final important contribution necessary for understanding
regime transition is the development of the mechanism combining
societal and institutional factors to explain the changes in political
systems.
Since transitions are the result of changes in the characteristics of
political systems, then the cause of regime transition is change in the
degree of participation and/or liberalization.
By examining the concept of participation, it is possible to
incorporate some terms presented in other works on political transition
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or consolidation. Changes in participation are manifested by increases or
decreases in the proportion of the population eligible to vote. Since the
extremes of the participation dimension are expressed by the
participation of a few or many, the model will incorporate the concepts
of elite and mass participation?.
In order to complete the mechanism, it is necessary to describe the
environment in which these groups participate. This mechanism will
incorporate Stepan's "...conceptually and politically useful...." distinction
between "...three important arenas of the polity: civil society, political
society, and the state.'" For this paper, mechanism will be used to
39 Burton, Gunther, and Higley, p. 4. The definition
of elites by the above authors will apply here also (see
p.8). Elites are n...persons who are able, by virtue of
their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to
affect national political outcomes regularly and
substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers in
the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental,
economic, military, professional, communications, and
cultural organizations and movements in a society." The
masses are everybody else.
40 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 3-4.
"Civil society is that arena where manifold social movements
and civic organizations from all classes attempt to
constitute themselves ... so that they can express
themselves and advance their interests. Political society
[is the] arena in which the polity specifically arranges
itself for political contestation to gain control over
public power and the state apparatus. The state is ... the
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive
system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus
but to structure relations between civil and public power
and to structure ... relationships within civil and
political society."
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describe the competition, cooptation, or cooperation (power relationship)
between elites and masses in the state apparatus, political society and
civil society.
Finally, this mechanism must be fully explained, in terms of its
elements, in order to describe the direct relationship between the
mechanism and the type of regime. It is this relationship that will
attempt to prove that the mechanism of regime change is the same in all
political systems.
As already noted, regime type is a function of the power
relationship between elites and masses in the three elements of society
(see Table 1).
An analysis of the power relationships expressed in Table 1 reveals
that the differing combinations of elements in the mechanism will result
in differing regime types. Various attempts have been made to classify
some regimes as hegemonic party systems, pseudodemocracies, stable-limited
democracies, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes4" but the typology and
definitions have been unsatisfactory. The exercise undertaken here will
not attempt to apply these labels to the current model at this time
"41 See Huntington in Robert A. Pastor, ed., Democracy
in the Americas, pp. 16-18; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset,
Politics in Developinq Countries, pp. 6-9; and Burton,
Gunther, and Higley, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in
Latin America and Southern Europe, pp. 3-8.
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because to do so would be in Dahl's words, "elaborate" and
"redundant.'4
TABLE 1
-ARENAS SUBJECT TO ELITE/MASS CONTROL-
CASE State Political Arena Civil Society REGIME TYPE
I mass mass control mass control Consolidated
cntrl Democracy
IIa compe- mass control mass control TOnconsol.
tition stable demo.
Tib compe- mass cntrl w/ mass control Uncon. unst.
tition pol signif opp Democracy
IIIa elite elite cntrl w/ mass/elite Uncon. unst.
cntrl pol signif opp competition Non-demo.
IIIb elite elite control mass/elite Uncon. stab.
cntrl competition Non-demo.
IV elite elite control elite control Consolidated
cntrl Non-demo.
[source.- author's table indicating the regime type as a
function of the power relationship between elites and masses
in the three elements of society. The case numbers will be
used for easy reference in the following section examining
the mechanism of regime transition.]
In the first case, a consolidated democracy, the masses have
control over the elites in the state apparatus, political society and civil
society. Elites still'function in the all three arenas but the masses have de
facto and de jure control of over all the elements. The degree of
liberalization, contestation or [loyal] opposition is very high and all eight
42 Polvarchy, p. 6.
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requirements of the procedural definition of democracy exist.
Legitimacy is very high - the elites and masses cooperate or compete
according to the established rules. There are no politically significant
semiloyal or disloyal opposition movements, as there is little or no
reason for these groups to exist and the system is very stable.
In the last case, a consolidv 4 nu -democracy, the elites have
control over the masses in all three arenas of society. The degree of
legitimacy may be high in some extreme cases but it is more likely that
the elites effectively exercise, or possess the will and ability to exercise
the coercive power of the state to maintain order, if necessary. The
degree of contestation is very low and if it exists, may be limited only to
factions of the elite. There are no requirements of the procedural
definition of democracy available to the masses. If elections are held,
they are not "free and fair" and merely exist to provide some method by
which the regime can make claims to legitimacy. These political systems
are totally dominated by one political party or ban political activity
altogether.
Like the first case, cases Ha and llb are representative of a
democracy - all eight of Dahl's requirements exist in the political system
but these regimes are not consolidated. In both cases, there is mass
control of the state apparatus but there is competition by the elites. The
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masses have control over the political and civil arenas but, as mentioned
previously, these unconsolidated democratic regimes can be either stable
or unstable. Regimes in which the competition between elites and
masses occurs within the bounds of the established rules are stable (case
Ha). Regimes with politically significant semiloyal or disloyal elite
opposition are unstable (case l1b).
Cases MIa and IIIb are representative of unconsolidated non-
democracies. These regimes are non-democratic because the system fails
to provide all eight requirements of procedural democracy. It may be
difficult to distinguish actual cases in these categories from
unconsolidated democracies but these regimes generally fail to provide
at least one requirement fully. In most cases, it seems that the
requirements found to be lacking are free and fair elections or the ability
of electoral competition to have an effective influence over government
policies. Extreme cases, in which most of the procedural requirements
are absent, are easy to identify. Elites have at least de facto and in some
cases, de jure control over the state apparatus. Again, unconsolidated
regimes may be either stable or unstable. In stable regimes (case MUb),
there may be some mass competition in the civil society arena but elites
have control over political society and there are no politically significant
semiloyal or disloyal opposition groups. In unstable, unconsolidated
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non-democracies (case lila), the elites maintain control over the political
arena but competition is provided by a politically significant semiloyal or
disloyal mass opposition. In these cases, the elites are also attempting to
maintain or regain some semblance of control over the masses in civil
society but this arena is, for all intents and purposes, under mass
control.
D. TYPES OF REGIME TRANSITION
There is one last distinction that must be made regarding the
model That distinction is the way in which a change in a political
system, or more simply put, a regime transition, is manifest. Given that
the term mechanism is used to describe the power relationship in a
regime, the term transition type will be used to describe the form or
mode of regime transition.
The process of regime transition can occur in one or two abstract
ways. The most common form of transition is the "shift" of a system
along the regime type axis through an increase or decrease in the
number of the procedural requirements that determine regime type.
The other form of transition is a shift along the participation axis.
Regimes can become more inclusionary by increasing the proportion of
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the adult population eligible to vote or become ;-,ore exclusionary by
decreasing the numbers.
These two abstract forms of change occur in modem political
systems in various ways. First, the shift along the regime type axis can
occur through the following types of transition: liberalization, regression
(reverse liberalization), revolution or coup d'etat. These "horizontal"
transitions, -apart from involving changes in the degree of liberalization,
opposition, or contestation, also have a time element incorporated.
These transitions can be slow and have an incremental effect on the
degree of change as in the cases of liberalization and regression or the
transitions can occur quickly and have a great impact on the degree of
change as in the cases of coups d'etat and revolution.
The second form of transition, an increase or decrease in the
degree of participation, does not appear to have a time element involved.
An increase in the population entitled to participate can be sudden or
the end of a long struggle. Once given, the right to vote is usually not
withdrawn. If it is withdrawn, it is often the result of a sudden loss of
rights due to changes in the degree of liberalization.
The types of regime transition that occur in political systems must
be analyzed in terms of the mechanism of regime transition (the power
relationship between elites and masses).
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Liberalization almost always involves an increase in the number of
the procedural requirements available to the population in a political
system. In non-democracies, this shift towards a democracy involves
greater opportunities for opposition and contestation between the elites
and the masses in the three elements of society. Practically,
liberalization involves a decrease in elite control or competitiveness with
a corresponding increase in mass control or competitiveness. In general
terms, liberalization can occur in all regime types, but it should more
specifically be utilized to describe transitions that occur up to the point
at which seven of the eight requirements of a democracy are fulfilled.
The transition of a political system to a democracy by the attainment of
all eight requirements can now be termed democratization. Because it is
possible for regimes to exceed the minimum requirements of a
democracy, democratization may also be utilized to describe democratic
regimes in a transition toward the fulfillment of broader definitions of
democracy, but the phrase consolidation of democracy is perhaps more
practical for distinguishing this type of regime transition from the actual
transition of a non-democratic regime to a democratic one. As noted
above, liberalization does not always involve an increase in the
procedural requirements - the consolidation of a democracy is a form of
liberalization that does not involve an increase in the procedural
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requirements of the definition because all the requirements are already
met.
Regression is the opposite of liberalization. Like liberalization, it
can be generally described as being comprised of at least one, and as
many as three, of the following distinct phases: the deconsolidation of a
democratic regime, the regression to a non-democracy, and the
consolidation of a non-democratic regime.
The deconsolidation of a democratic regime does not involve a
decrease in the number of procedural requirements available to the
population of a political system. Rather, this type of regression is caused
by increased semiloyal or disloyal competition by elites in the state and
political arenas that results in a transition from a consolidated
democracy to a stable or unstable, unconsolidated democracy. If
continued regression were to occur that resulted in a decrease in the
number of procedural requirements constituting a democracy, then the
transition to a non-democratic regime would occur. Finally, if the elites
in a non-democratic political system were to eliminate any semiloyal or
disloyal opposition, then the system would undergo the transition to a
consolidated non-democracy.
Liberalization and regression, like increases or decreases in
participation, are unique types of transition. Thes,_ types of transition
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involve a movement along an axis in only one distinct direction. The
following types of transition are characterized by the actors involved
rather than the direction of transition.
Revolutions and coups d'etat are rebellions - an uprising or
organized opposition intended to change or overthrow an existing
government or ruling authority.' While both types of transitions fall
under the same definition, each is distinct from the other. A revolution
is a [sudden] "...political overthrow brought about from within a given
system....", especially "...a forcible substitution of rulers or of ruling
cliques and the seizure of state power by [the militant vanguard of] a
subject class or nation".'M A coup d'etat is a "...sudden stroke of state
policy involving deliberate violation of constitutional forms by a group
of persons in authority".'% Both are similar in that they involve a
(relatively) sudden change in the ruling authority of a political system
and both transition types are forcible or extralegal. The distinction is in
the actors. In a coup, the political change is brought about by
individuals and institutions in positions of authority in the state
4 Morris, The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1087.
44 Ibid, p. 1113.
"41 Ibid, p. 304.
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apparatus. In a revolution, groups outside the state apparatus are the
main actors implementing change.
Unlike liberalization or regression that yield regime transitions in
one direction only, a revolution or coup d'etat can result in a regime
transition in either direction. It is theoretically possible that a coup, or
revolution, could result in the formation of a democracy just as it could
result in the creation of a non-democracy.
With the model complete, a brief overview of regime transition in
various political systems is now in order.
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IV. CASE STUDIES -
This chapter will examine the classification of different regimes
and a limited number of regime transitions that have occurred in various
political systems. The analysis will assist in formulating a hypothesis
that attempts to explain regime transition.
The first section of this chapter will provide various examples of
political systems for classification in the two-axis model. Since the
model theoretically encompasses the entire spectrum of possible regime
types, the classification of all modern political systems should be
possible. Given that such a task is beyond the scope of this thesis, the
examples in Table 2 are provided as representative cases for
classification purposes.
The second section of this chapter will focus on two major cases
involving regime transition: Argentina (1976-1983) and Germany (1919-
1934). These particular cases have been selected for the following
reasons: the cases (1) involve different types of regime transition; (2)
provide a cross-regional comparison; and, (3) provide a cross-period
comparison essential to testing the author's revised model. In short, the
theory should apply to all cases, in all regions, at all times. Finally, the
last portion of this section will briefly examine the political turmoil that
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occurred in Guatemala in late May and early June 1993 to test the
model's applicability in a situation involving the militay elite in a
possible case involving a liberalizing coup d'etat.
A. REGIME CLASSIFICATION IN THE TWO-AXIS MODEL
The following section briefly analyzes various political systems
and categorizes these systems into the revised two-axis model developed
in Chapter I1. See Table 2 for a classification of various regimes. Figure
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Notes: Most of the above classifications were made based on
information contained in the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook, 1991. The cases have been
reanalyzed to reflect the current political situations as of
early 1993, with the exception of Switzerland. The
exclusive, consolidated democratic categorization utilizes
the case of Switzerland prior to February 1971. Prior to
this date only males age 20 and older could vote." There
are no current examples of stable, exclusionary,
unconsolidated democracies (see the examination of South
Africa on pp. 38-39).
46 James Murray Luck, History of Switzerland, Palo
Alto, CA: The Society for the Promotion of Science and
Scholarship (SPOSS) Inc., 1985, p. 821.
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Figure 4
The classification of the United States as an inclusive, consolidated
democracy is based on the following-. it is a federal republic far
exceeding the minimum requirements of the procedural definition of a
democracy. The U.S. is stable (no politically significant semiloyal or
disloyal opposition) and allows citizens age 18 and older to participate in
elections (greater than 50 percent participation).
As mentioned in the note in Table 2, there currently exist no
exclusive, consolidated democracies. The most recent example of this
classification would be Switzerland prior to 7 February 1971.
The current government in Argentina fits the classification of a
stable, inclusive, unconsolidated democracy. There is no politically
significant semiloyal or disloyal opposition. Argentina remains
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unconsolidated - it has only recently (1983) made a transition back to
meeting the minimal requirements of the procedural definition of
democracy and will require more time before it is able to approach a
broader definition of democracy. Venezuela, until recently, could have
been classified as a stable, inclusive, unconsolidated democracy but that
changed on February 4, 1992. A coup d'etat was attempted against the
government headed by President Carlos Andres Perez.' Any "...efforts
to topple the regime itself, through organized coups or mass rebellions,
clearly manifest the collapse of democratic stability."'
The classification of South Africa as an unstable, exclusive,
unconsolidated democratic regime is based on the significant and violent
nature of the opposition faced by the white minority government. This
republic is classified as a democracy despite restricting political
participation to less than a quarter of the population. A possible case of
47 The New York Times, February 4, 1992, p. A3,
February 5, 1992, p. A10, and World Monitor, September,
1992, pp. 44-49.
48 See Burton, Gunther and Higley, pp. 2-3. Other
manifestations of democratic instability include: "...a
deliberate stifling of democracy through de facto or de jure
denial of civil and political rights...." and the inability
I .. .to keep the expression of conflict within nonviolent
bounds." As defined in chapter 2, the definition of
democracy used here is not qualified by restrictions on the
proportion of the population entitled to participate and the
restriction of voting rights in political systems conducting
free and fair elections does not constitute instability for
classification purposes.
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a stable, exclusionary, unconsolidated non-democracy might be South
Africa prior to the March 1960 civil unrest in Sharpville~planned by
organizers of the Pan-Africanist Congress, a militant offshoot of the
African National Congress, and the December 1961 formation of a
national liberation front by the ANC.O
The classification of Mexico as a stable, inclusive, unconsolidated
non-democracy has much support. Although Mexico has been
characterized as a democracy in previous analyses, it does not meet all
the procedural requirements of the definition. In Mexico's case, the
requirements most often found to be lacking are freedom of the press,
free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of preferenceO There are no
49 Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country
Study, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
1981, pp. 46-48. The transition to an inclusive democratic
regime may be set to occur on elections scheduled for April
27, 1994 -- South Africa's first multiracial elections (see
The New York Times, June 4, 1993, p. Al).
SO Although this exact terminology is unique, other
characterizations of Mexico as a limited-democracy, pseudo-
democracy, hegemonic one-party regime, or inclusive
authoritarianism are all based on the incomplete
satisfaction of the procedural requirements of a democracy.
See Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann Craig, The Mexican Political
System in Transition, (San Diego, CA: Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1991);
Daniel C. Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without
Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Politics in
Developing Countries; Wynia, The Politics of Latin American
Development; and Judith Gentleman, ed., Mexican Politics in
Transition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987).
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politically significant semiloyal or disloyal opposition groups in Mexico
and suffrage is universal and compulsory (but not enforced) beginning at
age 18.'
.An excellent example of an unstable, inclusive, unconsolidated
non-democracy is Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge guerrilla forces still
pose a significant threat to extensive areas of Cambodia and the current
government. Although elections were held in May 1993, in which over
85 percent of Cambodia's 4.7 million registered voters participated'
(inclusive), the country has not made the transition to democracy - the
elections were held to form a new national assembly, which will be
responsible for drafting a constitution and forming a new government5O
Additional factors hindering a possible transition include statements
from the governing Cambodian People's Party that indicate a possible
willingness to use force to hold onto power after its apparent defeat in
the elections.
The Sudan is similar to Cambodia for classification purposes with
one exception - it is exclusive. Since the 30 June 1989 coup and
sl The World Factbook, 1991, pp. 204-206.
52 The New York Times, May 27, 1993, p. A3.
53 Ibid, June 2, 1993, p. A4.
"14 Ibid, June 3, 1993, p. A5.
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imposition of martial law, the Republic of the Sudan has been ruled by
the military. The country is totally exclusive and non-democratic.
Executive and legislative authority is vested in a 13-member
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with the council chairman, Lt.
Gen. Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, acting as Prime Minister. Political
parties were banned and voting rights eliminated following the 1989
coup and no elections have been held. An Islamic state with a large
Sunni Muslim population (70%), Sudan is one of the world's poorest
countries and is buffeted by civil war and chronic political instabffity.5s
The Sudanese republic is classified as an unstable, exclusive,
unconsolidated non-democracy.
The Republic of Ghana is classified as a stable, exclusive,
unconsolidated non-democracy. Ghana has been ruled by the military
since 31 December 1981 when Flt. Lt. (Ret.) Jerry Rawlings assumed
power in a coup d'etat. The military government continues to ban
political activity and has held no elections. Although a small number of
communists and sympathizers are active these groups are not considered
politically significant semiloyal or disloyal opposition groups.-
ss The World Factbook, 1991, pp. 293-294.
S6 Ibid, pp. 114-115.
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The final two cases are classified as consolidated (Le., stable) non-
democracies. The first case, Cuba, is further classified as inclusive.
Elections were recently held in Cuba in which all citizens age 16 and
over were eligible to participate.5 The Cuban people were allowed to
vote secretly and directly for national and local parliamentary
representatives for the first time since Fidel Castro took power in 1959,
but the Cuban government is an excellent example of a state attempting
to seek legitimacy through "democratic processes" while falling far short
of fulfilling the procedural requirements of a democracy. The most
obvious flaws were evident in the electoral process itself - no opposition
parties or candidates were allowed on the ballots. There are no known
politically significant semiloyal or disloyal opposition groups currently
operating in Cuba although a significant potential threat may be posed
by a virulently anti-Castro, anti-communist, Cuban population residing
in the United States.
The final regime classified in the two-axis model is the State of
Bahrain - an exclusive, consolidated non-democracy. Bahrain's
government is a traditional monarchy ruled by Amir 'Isa bin Salman Al
Khalifa, in which elections are non-existent and political parties are
"S7 See "Cuban Election Holds a Few New Twists," The
Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1993, p. 8.
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prohibited. Although several small clandestine leftist and Islamic
fundamentalist groups have been active in the past, no -opposition
groups in Bahrain can be considered politically significanLt
B. EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF REGIME TRANSITION
Given that this thesis only concerns itself with regime transition in
already independent nation-states and not as a result of foreign military
conquest, a significant number of cases of regime transition will be
omitted from this section. Table 3 provides a partial list of political
systems that have experienced these regime transitionsYs
As with the previous section dealing with regime classification,
this section will briefly analyze a limited number of selected cases for
illustrative purposes. This thesis will only analyze the following
transitions: Argentina's regressive coup d'etat of 1976 and subsequent
liberalization and redemocratization (1983); and the case of Germany
(1919-1934), a dramatic case of democratic deconsolidation, regression
and non-democratic consolidation. The analysis of liberal or regressive
s The World Factbook, 1991, pp. 23-24.
59 See Polvarchy, Chapter 3, Table 3.1, for an
extensive list of political systems that have made a

































A. _IBERAL COUP D'ETAT:
Guatemala (1993)
B. REGRESSIVE COUP D'ETAT:




Thai!And (1951, 1957, 1958, 1971, 1976)
South Korea (1961)
Zaire (1965)
(source: this is a revised and updated table of Dahl's Table
3.1 on page 42 of Polvarchy. Tt is not intended to be a
comprehensive list of all such regime transitions.]
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revolutionary transitions will be omitted for the sake of brevity and to
maintain a focus on the theoretical aspects of this thesis. Finally,
although a case of a liberalizing coup d'ett (the transition from a non-
democ-Atic to a democratic regime) seems non-existent, the
developments in Guatemala in June 1993 provide an example that may
closely approximate this scenario and will be briefly commented on later.
To analyze these transitions without an examination of the political
history of these states would not provide a solid foundation upon which
to conduct the analysis but, for the sake of brevity, an extensive
historical analysis of these politi -l systems will be omitted here.'
1. Argentina, 1976 & 1983
The first case study examining regime transition is
Argentinza. 1 Two types of regime transition will be examined: the
60 Sources for the analytical examination of the
various cases cited above will be referenced later in the
individual case studies.
"6' For an analytical examination of Argentina's
political history see: George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl,
eds., Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America,
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); O'Donnell,
Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transitions From
Authoritarian Rule; James M. Malloy and Mitchell A.
Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Reqime
Transition in Latin America, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1987); Pastor, ed., Democracy in the
Americas; David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The
Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact, (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1993); and Alain
Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).
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regressive military coup d'etat of 1976 and the
liberalization/democratization that occurred after the disastrous military
defeat of the Argentine armed forces in the Falkland Islands War in
1982.
In March 1973, a Peronist candidate, Hector Campora, won
the presidential election in Argentina. Less than two months later, he
resigned tor open the way for new elections and the return of Juan Peron
from exile in Spain. This action was the beginning of the end of the
democratic regime that lasted in Argentina from 1973 to 1976. Peron's
election in October 1973 only served to increase the polarization of
Argentine society and political violence escalated dramatically after his
death less than one year later.6
Argentina was an unstable, unconsolidated democracy in the
mid-1970s. The chief internal threats that led to the 1976 military coup
were the leftist urban guerrilla movements, the Ejercito Revolucionario
Popular (ERP) and the Montoneros, and the "...more general climate of
political [and economic] chaos...." existing under the presidency of Isabel
Peron.'3
62 Edward Gibson in Pastor, ed., Democracy in the
Americas, pp. 194-198.
63 Desch, "Transitions to Democracy," p. 32.
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The military elite viewed these threats as significant to their
corporate interests as well as to the interests of society in general. The
coup of March 1976 set about to eliminate Argentina's internal threats
and the country made a transition from an unstable, inclusive,
unconsolidated democracy to an unstable, exclusive, unconsolidated non-
democracy."
The unity exhibited by the military in its solution to the
country's problems began to weaken when it succeeded in wiping out
the last remnants of the insurgency in 1978 (the regime became a stable,
unconsolidated non-democracy). Eventually, the junta's inability to
present a unified solution to the political questions surrounding
economic policies contributed to the increased factionalism between the
military elite and increased pressures "from below" (i.e., the masses) for
political change. The economic crisis in 1981 was the result of poor
administration of the country by the military-as-government (elite
control of the state apparatus) and this fostered anti-government/anti-
military sentiment among certain sectors of the population.65
In a last-ditch attempt to end internal divisions in the
military and rally nationalist support from the masses, the Argentine
64 Ibid, p. 32.
65 Philip Mauceri in Democracy in the Americas, p. 241.
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junta proceeded with a plan to invade the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in
April 1982. The quick defeat of the Argentine forces by the British only
deepened the regime's crisis with the public and increased cleavages in
the ruling elite. The junta began to disintegrate with the departure of
the Navy and Air Force chiefs. The economic and political elite became
divided and the masses pressed for change. The threat to the military
elite was too great and it withdrew from power in 1983 with the election
of Raul Alfonsin as president." See Figure 5 for a representation of
these two regime transitions in the two-axis model.
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Figure 5 - Argentina (1976-1983)
The above figure indicates the "relative" classifications of the
Argentine political system during the two regime transitions in question.
The 1976 unstable, inclusive, unconsolidated democracy underwent a
66 Ibid, pp. 241-242.
48
regressive coup d'etat to an unstable, exclusive, unconsolidated non-
democracy (post-coup position). During the liberalizing transition back
to democracy, the regime held elections as a stable, inclusive,
unconsolidated non-democracy prior to the redemocratization of the
Argentine political system with the installation of a new democratically
elected president.
2. Germany, 1919-1934
The democratic breakdown of the Weimar Republic (1918-
1933) and non-democratic consolidation of the Third Reich (1934-1945)
will provide the second case study of regime transition in this chapter.
Although the failure of democracy and the rise to power of
Adolf Hitler has been characterized as a legal revolution, it was not legal
or a revolution.67 Hitler did use democratic processes to position
himself advantageously to seize power, but the seizure and consolidation
of power were far from legal. The regime transition in Germany was
"revolutionary" in its speed, replacement of elites, changes in lifestyles
and business, shift in economic parameters, and establishment of new
67 Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The National Socialist
Seizure of Power,w in The Path to Dictatorship: 1918-1933,
translated by John Conway, New York, NY: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1966, p. 119, and Henry M.
Pachter, Modern Germany: A Social. Cultural, and Political
History, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978, p. 204.
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legal and administrative systems but it was not achieved by a
revolutionary transition.
The German Empire ended when the Weimar Republic was
"proclaimed by accident" on November 9, 1918 in the post-World War I
confusion and disorder that existed in Germany.' Elections were held
in January 1919 and on 6 February the National Constituent Assembly
opened in Weimar. The Weimar Constitution that took effect on 11
August 1919 gave the president considerable powers. Among these
powers was the "notorious" Article 48 that gave the president the right
to rule by emergency decree. The constitution also included a voting
system of proportional representation with universal suffrage for all
adult men and women, a first in Germany.' This constitution
establishedi Germany as an inclusive unconsolidated democratic regime
that was far from stable.
Germany was suffering greatly from its military defeat in
World War I and the period from 1919 to 1923 was marked by political
and economic turmoil. The Republic was under continuous attack by
the German elite, attempted putsches by the right, and social
63 Ellen E. Switzer, How Democracy Failed, Brattleboro,
VT: The Book Press, Inc., 1975, p. 10.
69 Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 160-162.
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mobilization, strikes, and revolutionary movements by the left, in the
context of mounting economic problems. War reparations and foreign
intervention contributed greatly to German anxiety. The rate of inflation
was sent spiralling out of control by the massive printing of paper
money. The economic situation was brought under some control by late
1923 with the introduction of a new currency and a restructuring of
reparations 0 -
Between 1924 and 1928, Germany seemed to experience a
period of relative stabilization, with some successes in the area of foreign
relations. But domestic political instability remained.' Despite the
apparent stabilization, neither the elites or the masses were genuinely
committed to the republic, and democracy was never truly consolidated.
Paul von Hindenburg, Imperial Germany's Field-Marshall during the
First World War, was elected president (1925-1934) and "...was positively
considering plans for the development of a right-wing, authoritarian
form of government excluding parliamentary and social-democratic
influence."72
70 Ibid, p. 158-164.
"71 Fritz Stern in the Introduction to The Path to
Dictatorship, p. xx, and Fulbrook, pp. 167-168.
72 Fulbrook, p. 171.
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Between the August 1919 formation of the republic and the
October 1929 stock market crash on Wall Street, Germany had seen the
formation and collapse of 14 coalition governments. 3 Although the
economic crisis of the depression was a factor contributing to the
political pressures in Germany, there were also other factors at work.
Institutionally, the system of proportional representation and the
existence of a number of small political parties meant that no single
party was able to attain an overall majority. Also, the promulgation of
emergency decrees under the authority of Article 48 was increasingly
used to circumvent the problems encountered in the Reichstag.74
The unstable, unconsolidated democratic republic was finally
"doomed" by the coincidence of two factors in the years between 1930
and 1933: the "...attacks on parliamentary government by the old
elites...." and "...the rise of a new mass movement [by] a large proportion
of the population seduced by the appeals of a charismatic leader figure,
Adolf Hitler."73 In March 1932, Hitler ran against Hindenburg in the
election for president. Hindenburg failed to achieve a majority (49.6% to
71 The Path to Dictatorship, Appendix A, pp. 189-192.
74 Fulbrook, pp. 171-172; Pachter p. 191, and The Path
to Dictatorship, Appendix A, pp. 194-198.
"75 Fulbrook, p. 173.
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Hitler's 30.1%) in the first election but won the run-off election in
April!7 Hindenburg dismissed the 16th coalition goverpment headed
by Heinrich Bruening (March 1930 - May 1932) partly because of
Bruening's mismanagement of Hindenburg's re-election.7 The
economic and political upheaval in Germany reached a peak in the
autumn of 1932 and several coalition cabinets fell. With no stable
leadership, Hindenburg appointed Hitler as chancellor on January 30,
1933.78
The regime, undergoing a regressing transition since the
formation of the republic, quickly made a transition to non-democracy
under Hitler. In February, the Reichstag was burned down (probably
under Hitler's orders) and Hindenburg signed a decree suspending most
civil liberties under the Weimar constitution. The last "free" elections
were held on March 5, 1933 and the National Socialists still failed to
garner a majority in the Reichstag. To obtain a majority, all communist
votes were voided and when the Reichstag met on the evening of 23
March, Hitler forcefully prevented the communists and 21 Social
Democrats from attending the session. Now with the necessary two-
76 The Path to Dictatorship, Appendix C, p. 208.
77 Fulbrook, p. 174, and Pachter, p. 194.
78 Switzer, p. xii; Fulbrook, p. 176; and Pachter, p
198.
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thirds majority, Hitler secured the passage of the Enabling Law that
authorized him to pass laws by decree based on ArticleA48 of the
constitution. By the summer of 1933 all political parties were outlawed
and Hitler became Der Fuhrer in August 1934 after Hindenburg's
death.7 See Figure 6 for a representation of this regime transition in
the two-axis model.
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Figure 6 - Germany (1918-1934)
In the figure above, the Weimar Republic formed in 1919 is
classified as an unstable, inclusionary, unconsolidated democracy.
Between 1919 and 1933, the political system was in a regressive
transition. The last "free" elections were held on March 5, 1933, but the
transition to an unstable, inclusive, unconsolidated non-democracy
"• Switzer, p. xii; Fulbrook, pp. 178-180; Pachter, pp.
202-210; and Bracher in The Path to Dictatorship, pp. 121-
130.
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occurred on March 23. The degree of participation also decreased
during the passage of the Enabling Act because some of the members of
the Reichstag were not allowed to participate. The regression continued
and the degree of participation decreased further when political parties
were banned on July 14, 1933. Finally, Hitler consolidated his exclusive,
stable non-democracy with the death of Hindenburg on August 1, 1934
and the personal oath of loyalty to Hitler taken by all members of the
armed forces on August 2, 1934.
The cases of Argentina and Germany provide excellent
examples of different political systems, in different regions of the world,
at different points in time, and representing different types of regime
transition. By analyzing the degrees of participation and liberalization,
these cases demonstrate that the revised two-axis model does allow for
the classification of regimes by type. Additionally, the analysis of these
regime transitions can be adequately explained in terms of the
mechanism developed in Chapter MIT. The regime transitions in these
cases are a direct result of changes in the power relationship between the
elites and the masses in the three elements of society.
3. Guatemala, 1993
Although this section is not intended to be an inclusive
analysis of examples of all types of regime transitions, some additional
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observations are worth noting. In the case of a liberalizing coup d'etat,
the events in Guatemala in the spring of 1993 are worth inspection.
On May 25, 1993, Guatemala's president, Jorge Serrano Elias,
dissolved the Congress and the Supreme Court and suspended
constitutional rights in what appeared to be a military-backed effort to
stem growing political and economic protests.80 This "auto-coup" by
the head of state, apparently with the military's support, bore striking
resemblance to the actions taken by Peru's President Fujimori in April
1992. However, growing opposition to the end of democracy came from
opposition politicians and former military leaders. On May 26, the
country's Constitutional Court declared the coup illegal.' By May 31,
military leaders were backing away from their support for President
Serrano's seizure of dictatorial powers and on 1 June a counter-coup by
the military forced Serrano from power.
The Guatemalan government, under military control after
Serrano's removal, announced that Vice President Gustavo Espina
Salguero would take over as the new leader and it appeared that
democracy would be restored. The Congress, however, did not indicate
so The New York Times, May 26, 1993, p. A3.
8' Ibid, May 27, 1993, p. A4.
82 Ibid, June 3, 1993, P. A3.
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that it would accept the vice president's new role. The Congress
contended that Espina's resignation was "presented" upon President
Serrano's removal from power. It appeared that Mr. Espina, with
military backing, would become president, but as of 4 June, he still had
not been administered the oath of office.'
By the afternoon of Saturday, June 5, 1993, it -appeared as if
all sides were -going to accept a compromise moderate candidate. The
military elite still had effective "veto" power over the situation. The
business elite, afraid of the economic impact caused by the suspension of
foreign aid and possible sanctions, joined the mass public in an attempt
to control the outcome of the political fight.
When the Congress began voting Saturday afternoon, the
political and business leaders thought moderate candidate, Arturo
Herbruger Asturias, would win and become the next president. But
after the results of the first secret ballot had been tabulated, the former
Attorney General of Human Rights and frequent critic of the military,
Ramiro de Leon Carpio, had managed to garner a majority of the votes,
but was short of the required two-thirds to confirm. Before the
Legislature voted again, a senior military official made a telephone call
to the podium where the President of Congress sat to say that the
83 Ibid, June 4, 1993, p. A5.
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military would accept de Leon Carpio as the new Commander-in-
Chief." Although the exact details are still unclear, it appears that this
case may provide an example of a liberalizing coup d'etat.
Clearly, the military elite in Guatemala exercise a significant
degree of political power. Although pre-sure from business elites and
the mass public was a factor in the ouster of President Serranc., it is
doubtful that it could have happened had not the military elite
withdrawn its support of Serrano's "auto-coup". The military elite's
intervention was the major force in Serrano's removal and its decision
not to use the coercive power of the state in the subsequent political
settlement allowed Guatemala to return to a democratic form of
government. Guatemala's reclassification as a democracy can certainly
be debated but the instability of the political system is beyond question.
Until civilian controls over the military are strengthened significantly,
the system balances precariously in the struggle between the military
and political elite on one hand, and the business elite and the masses on
the other.
This section analyzing regime transitions in Argentina,
Germany, and Guatemala has demonstrated the applicability of the
revised two-axis model and the mechanism explaining regime transition.
84 Ibid, June 7, 1993, p. A6.
58
By describing all political -ystems in terms of their two basic
characteristics, the degrees of liberalization and paiticipation, it is
possible to categorize the regime by type. By describing changes in the
power relationship between elites and masses in a society, it is possible
to make a thorough comparative analysis of regime transition in
different cases, at different points in time, anywhere in the world.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction a number of questions were raised that were
addressed throughout the thesis. Specifically, the thesisaddresses (1) the
basic characteristics of political systems; (2) the degree of differences in
these characteristics; and (3) changes in the characteristics of political
systems. Based on Robert Dahl's analysis of political systems the thesis
develops a new model to explain change in modern political systems.
Previous analyses of political systems have encountered a basic
definitional problem by either using an inclusive definition of democracy
or a procedural definition without a method for distinguishing between
democratic and non-democratic regimes. The thesis presents a revised
two-axis model that addresses the definitional problem and combines the
concepts of consolidation and stability into a more effective system for
categorizing regimes and conducting comparative analysis.
A mechanism to explain regime transition is developed that
combines societal and institutional factors. Differences in the degree of
participation of a society's population are combined with the concept of
a society organized into three arenas for the expression and
advancement of interests. The combination of these concepts yields the
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matrix in Table 1 that relates elite/mass competition in society to thn.
structure and stability of a political system.
Finally, the thesis examines various methods of regime transition
and applies the theory to several cases. The following cases are briefly
examined and classified by regime type in the two-axis model: the
United States; Switzerland, prior to 1971; Argentina; Venezuela; the
Republic of South Africa; Cambodia; the Republic of the Sudan; Mexico;
Ghana; Cuba; and, the State of Bahrain. Additionally, an extensive
analysis of the mechanism of regime transition is conducted in the
following cases: Argentina's 1976 coup d'etat and 1983
redemocratization; Germany's deconsolidation of democracy in the
Weimar Republic and consolidation of non-democracy in the Third Reich
(1919-1934); and, the possible case of a liberalizing coup d'etat in
Guatemala in May and June of 1993.
An important contribution of this thesis has been the development
of a better model to assist in the classification and comparative analysis
of political systems, but the primary contribution of the thesis is the
advancement of the hypothesis that the mechanism of regime transition is
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the same in all political systems even though the types of transition are
different.w
The mechanism of regime transition is the power relationship
between elites and masses in a society. When a regime transition occurs,
it is a result of a change in the balance of power betweens elites and
masses in one or more of the three elements of a society. -The transition
does not occur as a result of some other factor such as change (or lack of
change) in the economy. For example, a decrease in per capita income
does not directly result in a change in the political system. Any such
variables are merely antecedents to the changing interests of the elites
and masses in a society. It is the organization (or lack of organization)
of elites and masses in the state, political society, and civil society that-
allows for the advancement (or attempted advancement) of the interests
of elites and masses. When the relative strength of one set of interests
increases with respect to the other, one group may gain enough power to
change the overall balance of power between the groups. The changed
power structure may result in regime transition.
85 This mechanism applies only to regime transition in
(1) already independent states and (2) independent states
not subject to foreign military intervention.
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